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I. INTRODUCTION
1

It was viewed as a “historic ruling,” a “sweeping, landmark
2
3
4
victory,” affirming gay rights and opening many doors, including
5
establishing rights in the military,
ending homosexual
6
7
discrimination, and even paving the road to homosexual marriage.
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1
Jerry Elmer, A Victory for Gay Rights in Lawrence v. Texas, 52 R.I. BAR J. 5, 5
(2003).
2
Andrew Cohen, Sodomy Ruling’s Ripple Effect (June 26, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/26/news/opinion/courtwatch/main560
593.shtml. The Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund claimed it was “the most
significant ruling ever for lesbian and gay Americans.” Liberty Press, Sodomy Law
Struck Down, U.S. Supreme Court Finds Texas Homosexual Conduct Law Unconstitutional
(July 3, 2003), available at http://www.libertypress.net/archives/ksjuly03.html
[hereinafter Sodomy Law Struck Down].
3
Elmer, supra note 1.
4
See Patti Waldmeir, Big Eye on the Little Guy, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at 16.
In a decision that has already become a major political issue for
President Bush, the court ruled, in the broadest possible terms, that
homosexuals have rights too. Up to a point, most of America would
agree with that statement. But the ruling went beyond that point,
opening the door – despite its disclaimers – to full legalisation of
homosexual relationships, including gay and lesbian marriage.
Id.
5
Martha Lleder, Lawrence Decision Launches Military ‘Gay’ Ban Challenges,
Concerned Women for America (July 16, 2003), at
http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4275&department=CFI&cate
goryid=cfreport.
6

This ruling effectively strikes down the sodomy laws in every state that
still has them . . . . But its impact is even broader - for decades, these
laws have been a major roadblock to equality. They’ve labeled the
entire gay community as criminals and second-class citizens. Today
[June 26], the Supreme Court ended that once and for all.
Sodomy Law Struck Down, supra note 2 (quoting Ruth Harlow, Legal Director at
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“The ruling closed the door on an era of intolerance and ushered in
a new era of respect and equal treatment for gay Americans . . . . [It]
is the most important civil rights decision handed down by the court
8
in a generation.”
The above statements describe the sentiment after Lawrence v.
9
Texas, in which the United States Supreme Court held that it is no
10
longer a crime to engage in homosexual sodomy. However, within a
few months, it became obvious that the Lawrence decision “may turn
11
out not to be quite the legal earthquake many anticipated.” While
the Lawrence decision has many possible implications, this Comment
focuses on the impact the Lawrence decision will have on teenage
homosexual sexual relations, specifically, what bearing the case is
expected to have on Matthew Limon, a Kansas teenager incarcerated
12
for 206 months for engaging in homosexual activity.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and lead counsel on the Lawrence case)
(alteration in original). See also Jack Siu, 365Gay.com Newsmaker of 2003: John Lawrence
and Tyron Garner (Dec. 21, 2003), at
http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/2003Review/2003Newsmaker.htm.
The
Lawrence decision “has become a powerful tool for gay people in all 50 states where
gay [people] continue fighting to be treated equally. Sodomy laws criminalized oral
and anal sex by consenting gay couples and in some states heterosexual couples but
[were] used almost exclusively to justify discrimination against [homosexual
people].” Id.
7
See The Next Battle: Gay Marriage (June 30, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/02/national/printable561385.shtml
(“The landmark Lawrence v. Texas decision, which threw out a Texas law banning
sodomy and similar statutes in 13 states, was widely seen as the prelude to a
discussion of gay marriage.”). “‘This ruling starts an entirely new chapter in our fight
for equality for lesbians and gay men,’ Ruth Harlow . . . said.” Sodomy Law Struck
Down, supra note 2. “Though not decided upon equal protection grounds, the
majority decision still calls into question other legal limitations on the rights of
homosexuals, including the right to state recognition of homosexual marriages, and
the right to serve in the military.” NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia: Lawrence v.
Texas, at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Lawrence-v.-Texas (last
visited Apr. 18, 2004). See also Justice Scalia’s dissent: “[W]hat justification could
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples . . . .”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8
Siu, supra note 6.
9
539 U.S. 558.
10
Id.
11
Joseph Landau, Misjudged: What Lawrence Hasn’t Wrought, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 16, 2004, at 16.
12
Some fear that Lawrence will result in Limon’s release. “It appears that age-ofconsent laws that differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual sex may be
another casualty of the U.S. Supreme Court decision striking down Texas’ law
banning homosexual acts.” Lawrence Decision Opens Way for Legal Teen Sodomy,
Concerned
Women
for
America
(July
2,
2003),
at
http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4217&department=CFI&cate
goryid=cfreport.
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Shortly after his eighteenth birthday, Matthew Limon was caught
13
14
engaging in consensual sexual activities with a minor. M.A.R., his
“victim,” was just short of fifteen years of age at the time of the
15
activity. Kansas criminalizes the engagement in sexual activities with
16
a child under the age of sixteen. As a result, Limon was convicted
17
under Kansas’s criminal sodomy statute, which defines criminal
sodomy as “sodomy with a child who is 14 or more years of age but
18
Limon’s sentence for this offense is
less than 16 years of age.”
19
seventeen years.
Recognizing that teenage sexual experimentation should not be
punished as severely as other statutory rape, Kansas has instituted a
20
so-called “Romeo and Juliet” law, which serves as a mitigating statute
13

“M.A.R. consented to the oral-genital contact; upon request of M.A.R., the
defendant stopped oral contact with the victim.” Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon v.
Kansas, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 00CR36) at
http://archive.aclu.org/court/limon_cert.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
The Brief for Petitioner will be cited because various documents in the case are not
otherwise available (i.e., the Transcript of Hearing Upon Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, Stipulation of Facts, Transcript of Trial to the Court, Transcript of
Continuation of Sentencing, Memorandum Opinion, Order Denying Motion for
Rehearing of Modification, and the Order Denying Petition for Review).
14
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Justices Extend Decision on Gay Rights
and Equality, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at 10. See also Brief for Petitioner at 3a, Limon
(No. 00CR36).
15
Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
16
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (2002). Kansas, like many other states, has age of
consent laws for sexual activities. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-9 (2002) (age of consent is
sixteen); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (2003) (age of consent is seventeen); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (2003) (age of consent is fifteen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.093 (2003) (age of consent is eighteen). For an interesting discussion of age
of consent laws and their implications, see Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait:
Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 313 (2003). See also infra Part V for discussion of consent.
17
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505.
18
Id. at § 21-3505(a)(2). Note that oral sex is a form of sodomy under this
statute. Id.
19
See ‘Romeo & Juliet Law’ Gives Gay Teen 16 Years More in Prison than Heterosexual
Would Serve, American Civil Liberties Union (Sept. 28, 2001), at
http://archive.aclu.org/news/2001/n092801a.html.
20
Unlawful Voluntary Sexual Relations, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522 (2002). This
statute
is popularly known in Kansas as the ‘Romeo and Juliet Law.’ This
refers to Shakespeare’s literary masterpiece whose central story
concerns the love between a noble 13-year-old Veronese maiden, and a
youthful Veronese nobleman just a few years older than she. The
purpose of the statute is to recognize the judgment that consensual
sexual activity between a young adult and not-quite adult, although
wrong, is not as criminal as sexual activity between persons farther in
age.
Brief for Petitioner at 6a-7a, Limon (No. 00CR36). This law “was passed in 1999 to
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21

when both actors are close in age. To trigger the Romeo and Juliet
law, the offender must be less than nineteen years of age, the
offender must be less than four years older than the child, the child
and the offender must be the only parties involved in the sexual act,
22
and both members must be of the opposite sex. If all factors are
met, then the statute applies, reducing the prison penalty from a
23
maximum of seventeen years to a maximum of fifteen months.
Limon, at the time of the sexual conduct, had just turned
24
eighteen; the age difference between the two actors was just over
three years; there is no allegation that anyone, other than Limon and
25
M.A.R., was involved in the conduct.
Thus, all of the factors
necessary to trigger Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law were present,
except for one—M.A.R. and Limon were both males, thus not
26
“members of the opposite sex.” As a result, the Romeo and Juliet
27
law did not apply, and Limon was prosecuted and convicted under
28
the harsher criminal sodomy statute. The difference between the
29
two punishments is almost sixteen years.
Limon has already served over three years of his prison sentence
separate consensual teenage sexual relationships from cases in which older adults
exploited young children.” Chris Grenz, Prospects for Change in Laws Appear Poor,
TOPEKA CAP. – J. (Kan.), Feb. 15, 2003, at 7, available at 2003 WL 6855385.
21
See Deb Price, Courts Need to Apply Same Rules to All, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 13,
2003, at 7. Kansas has a “‘Romeo and Juliet’ law – a sort of get-out-of-jail-free card
that many state legislatures give similarly aged sexually active teens while rightly
applying serious penalties against adults who have sex with minors.” Id.
22
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a).
23
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522. Greenhouse, supra note 14, at 10. See also Brief for
Petitioner at 3, Limon (No. 00CR36).
24
Greenhouse, supra note 14, at 10. See also Brief for Petitioner at 4a, Limon (No.
00CR36).
25
See Brief for Petitioner at 39a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
26
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a).
27
“Well, unfortunately for Limon, Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law is meant to be
taken literally. It applies only to Romeos and Juliets, not to Romeos and Mercutios.
It was explicitly written to exclude application in cases involving same-sex activity.”
Michael Bronski, The Other Matthew, BOSTON PHOENIX, Feb. 20, 2003, at
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/other_stories/documents/0
2704491.htm.
28
Limon was convicted under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505.
29
See ‘Romeo & Juliet Law’ Gives Gay Teen 16 Years More in Prison than Heterosexual
Would Serve, supra note 19. Matt Coles, Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, which filed a friend-of-the-court
brief on Limon’s behalf stated:
The only difference between a year in jail and 17 years is whether or
not you’re gay . . . . Matt Limon will be 36 years old by the time he’s
released, having spent half of his life in prison—while a heterosexual
person would have been released before turning 19.
Id.
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and has over a decade left to serve. Under Bowers v. Hardwick, which
held there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy, Limon had
a slim chance of release; however, Limon now may have new hope for
an early release, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent
31
32
“landmark” decision in Lawrence v. Texas. The Lawrence decision
33
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and has opened many doors, perhaps
34
even in Limon’s case. Just one day after the Lawrence decision, the
United States Supreme Court instructed the Kansas Court of Appeals
35
to re-examine Limon’s case.
Oral arguments took place on
36
December 2, 2003; however, in the following month, the Kansas
37
Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed his conviction.
Limon’s attorney challenged this decision in the Kansas Supreme
38
Court, which granted a petition for review on May 25, 2004.
Depending on the outcome in the Kansas Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court may be the next venue to hear this
39
case.
Initially, the Kansas Court of Appeals relied on Bowers when
40
sentencing Limon; because Lawrence overruled Bowers, Lawrence now
41
serves as the new precedent. The United States Supreme Court
30

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Charles Lane, Justices Overturn Texas Sodomy Ban, Ruling is Landmark Victory for
Gay Rights, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at A01.
32
539 U.S. 558.
33
478 U.S. 186.
34
See Lane, supra note 31, at A01 (quoting Elizabeth Birch, executive director of
the Human Rights Campaign, a leading gay rights organization, “This is an historic
day for fair-minded Americans everywhere. This ruling opens the door for new
advances toward full equality.”).
35
In a very brief decision, the Supreme Court simply stated: “On petition for writ
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Kansas. Petition for writ of certiorari granted.
Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals of Kansas for further
consideration in light of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. [558] (2003).” Limon v.
Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003).
36
Appeal Begins for Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex (Dec. 2, 2003), at
http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/120203limonAppeal.htm.
37
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
38
Kansas v. Limon, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284, at *1 (Kan. May 25,
2004).
39
See Stephanie Francis Ward, Avoiding Lawrence: Courts Considering Last Year’s
Major Gay Rights Ruling are Treading Carefully, 90 A.B.A.J. 16 (June 2004) (stating that
the United States Supreme Court may take this case).
40
The Kansas Court of Appeals relied on Bowers, now overruled, and held: “The
impact of Bowers on [this] case is obvious . . . . [T]here is no denial of equal
protection when [homosexual] behavior is criminalized or treated differently . . . .”
Brief for Petitioner at 12a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
41
“. . . Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
31
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recognized Lawrence’s implication on Limon’s case, thus instructing
42
the Kansas Court of Appeals to reconsider Limon v. Kansas “in light
43
of” Lawrence.
Lawrence and its ambiguous language, however,
support several different interpretations, and the Kansas Court of
Appeals chose a narrow version. Further, while opening the door,
Lawrence leaves many unanswered questions. Lawrence, after all,
stands for the proposition that consenting adults have the right to
44
It is questionable, and
privacy to engage in homosexual acts.
45
doubtful, that this right extends to minors. Precisely what effect, if
at all, Lawrence will have on Limon remains to be seen. Clearly,
Lawrence has opened up some doors; nevertheless, many other
46
barriers remain intact.
Whether the Kansas Supreme Court will
47
interpret Lawrence broadly or narrowly will be evident in the future.
If interpreted broadly, Limon may have a chance to be released;
however, Lawrence may not have any impact on Limon’s case, other
than its remand. Thus, it remains to be seen how far the Lawrence
case will extend and whether it is, indeed, a “landmark victory . . .
48
[which] opens the door for new advances toward full equality.”
This Comment will address how Lawrence has affected and may

overruled.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Precedent is defined as “1. The making of law
by a court in recognizing and applying new rules while administering justice. 2. A
decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts
or issues.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (8th ed. 2004).
In law a precedent is an adjudged case or decision of a court of justice,
considered as furnishing a rule or authority for the determination of
an identical or similar case afterwards arising, or of a similar question
of law. The only theory on which it is possible for one decision to be
an authority for another is that the facts are alike, or, if the facts are
different, that the principle which governed the first case is applicable
to the variant facts.
WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 288 (3d ed. 1914).
42
Kansas v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
43
Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955.
44
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“[T]wo adults, who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engage[] in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle . . .
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
45
“It appears that age-of-consent laws that differentiate between heterosexual
and homosexual sex may be another casualty of the U.S. Supreme Court decision
striking down Texas’ law banning homosexual acts.” Lawrence Decision Opens Way for
Legal Teen Sodomy, supra note 12. See also discussion infra Part IV.
46
“. . . Lawrence may turn out not to be quite the legal earthquake many
anticipated.” Landau, supra note 11.
47
The Kansas Supreme Court granted Limon’s Petition for Review on May 25,
2004. Kansas v. Limon, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284, at *1 (Kan. May 25,
2004).
48
See supra notes 31 and 34 and accompanying text.
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affect Limon. Part II will explain the decision of Limon v. Kansas. Part
III will explore the Lawrence v. Texas decision and its influence. Part
IV will then compare the two cases, suggesting that Lawrence may not
be as helpful as commentators first believed, as there are several
material differences between the cases. Part V will then explore
Lawrence’s unanswered questions as they pertain to Limon, posing
whether Limon can be reversed regardless.
In addition, this Comment highlights the importance of Limon.
Limon is much more than a “test case.” It serves three independent
purposes. First, Limon is essential in expounding the ambiguities of
Lawrence. Second, Limon shows that even post-Lawrence, states can
implement indirect regulation (i.e., higher age of consent laws) to
prevent homosexual activity. If Limon is overturned, the decision
would serve as a preventative measure against such intolerance.
49
Lastly, Limon offers an opportunity to clarify Romer v. Evans, and
determine what standard of scrutiny applies to laws involving
homosexual classifications.
II. LIMON V. KANSAS
In mid-February 2000, Limon and M.A.R., while residents of a
50
group home for the developmentally disabled, engaged in
51
consensual sexual activity. M.A.R., the “victim,” was over fourteen
52
years of age at this time, but under sixteen. Matthew Limon, the
53
defendant, just turned eighteen.
Had Limon engaged in this activity with a female, the conduct
would have triggered the Romeo and Juliet law, giving him a
54
maximum prison sentence of fifteen months.
However, since
Limon was a homosexual and engaged in sexual activity with another
male, he did not receive protection under the Romeo and Juliet law.
Kansas prosecuted Limon under the harsher criminal sodomy
55
56
statute and sentenced him to seventeen years in prison. Limon
49

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Chris Grenz, Kline Appears on National Talk Show, TOPEKA CAP. – J. (Kan.), Oct.
1, 2003, at 7, available at 2003 WL 62492982. While the fact that the two males were
mentally disabled might have been significant, it did not play a role in the opinion,
and will not be explored in this Comment.
51
See Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
52
See id.
53
See id. The incident occurred precisely two weeks after Limon turned 18
(Limon’s date of birth is February 2, 1982; the date of the sexual activity was
February 16, 2000). Id.
54
Grenz, supra note 50, at 7.
55
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(2).
56
Grenz, supra note 50, at 7.
50
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essentially received sixteen more years for choosing to experiment
57
with a male rather than a female.
Although Limon’s attorney tried to apply the Romeo and Juliet
58
law to reduce Limon’s sentence, the district court refused to extend
this protective statute to Limon because his partner was not of the
59
opposite sex. The district court reasoned that the legislature “in its
wisdom” chose to make the mitigating statute only applicable to
60
heterosexual activity. The district court justified such actions, ruling
that “classifications honestly designed to protect the public interests
against evils which might otherwise occur are to be upheld unless
61
they are unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.”
Applying this
standard, the Kansas district court held that a state is empowered to
protect children, and, if the state chooses, it can penalize
62
heterosexual activity less severely than homosexual activity. Further,
the district court upheld the Romeo and Juliet law on the basis that it
does not “represent an invalid, illegitimate or improper exercise of
63
the legislation of police power in the Kansas legislature.” Thus, the
Kansas district court denied Limon’s motion to dismiss the charges
64
and apply the Romeo and Juliet law.
65
Following a bench trial, the Kansas district court convicted
Limon of one count of criminal sodomy, a “severity level 3 person
66
felony.”
Limon then sought a departure from the presumptive
sentence to a prison term no longer than fourteen months, or in the
67
The district
alternative, a dispositional departure to probation.
judge denied this request, asserting, “[T]here is not good and
68
sufficient reason . . . to grant a departure.” The district court judge
accordingly sentenced Limon to the custody of the Department of
69
Corrections for 206 months.
The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, in a decision

57

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Brief for Petitioner at 36a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See id.
63
Id. at 37a-38a
64
Brief for Petitioner at 38a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
65
Limon waived a jury trial. See id. at 27a.
66
Id. at 29a.
67
Id. at 21a. Limon argued that to impose this sentence would violate his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Id.
68
Id. at 17a.
69
Id. at 18a.
58
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71

without a published opinion. Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, the
appellate court opined that homosexuals do not belong to a
protected class, thus they do not receive the benefit of a strict scrutiny
72
analysis.
Further, this court claimed that “there is no present
indication that the [Bowers] decision would be different today” or that
the “United States Supreme Court or the Kansas Supreme Court
73
would adopt the position taken by Limon.”
Limon appealed this decision to the Kansas Supreme Court,
74
which denied his petition for review. The petition presented the
following issue for review:
Do laws that impose a 17-year prison sentence for consensual oral
sex between teenagers of the same sex violate the Equal
Protection Clause where the sentence would be no more than 15
75
months if the teenagers were members of the opposite sex?

The Kansas Supreme Court refused to hear this case, and thus
did not address the question of whether the Limon decision violates
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Equal Protection Argument
In his brief for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
Limon mainly argued that dramatically different penalties for
identical acts of consensual sodomy between teenagers violates the
76
Equal Protection Clause because the “sexual orientation of the
defendant, rather than the conduct, determines which statute, and
77
therefore which penalty, applies.” The penalties under the Romeo
and Juliet law and sodomy statute not only differed, but the Romeo
78
and Juliet statute set forth a much more lenient punishment.
Limon’s brief succinctly summarized the difference in treatment:
70

Brief for Petitioner at 3a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
478 U.S. 186.
72
Brief for Petitioner at 12a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
73
Id. at 9a, 12a.
74
Id. at 1a.
75
Id. (note that there is no page number; please refer to “Questions Presented”
section of Brief).
76
Id. at 9-18.
77
Id. at 3.
78
Under the Romeo and Juliet law, the first and second offenses result in
presumptive probation, and a third offense results in a maximum sentence of fifteen
months. Under the criminal sodomy statute, a first offense carries a presumptive
sentence of 55-61 months, a second offense carries an 89-100 months sentence, and a
third offense carries 206-228 months penalty. Further, only a criminal sodomy
statute violation is categorized as a sexually violent crime, which triggers mandatory
sex offender status. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Limon (No. 00CR36).
71
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“Heterosexual teenagers who engage in consensual oral sex are
punished under the Romeo and Juliet law, while gay teenagers who
engage in consensual oral sex are treated as child molesters and are
79
punished under Kansas’s criminal sodomy law.”
Further, Limon’s brief raised the policy implication of this law:
Kansas, by limiting the mitigating statute to members of the same sex,
“subjects gay teenagers to additional criminal penalties that are based
not on any difference in their actions but on the State’s moral
disapproval of their sexual orientation toward members of the
80
opposite sex.”
Limon added that, “[l]aws that single out gay
teenagers for special criminal sanctions legitimize other forms of
discrimination against gay teenagers and contribute to pervasive
social prejudice that has severe psychological consequences for all gay
81
teenagers . . . .”
In sum, Limon argued that the Romeo and Juliet law was
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause. His
reasoning consisted of three arguments: (1) the Romeo and Juliet law
benefits only heterosexuals; (2) Kansas law subjects homosexual
teenagers to a much harsher penalty that is not based on the conduct
itself, but instead is based on the sex of the person with whom they
engaged in this conduct; and (3) because the conduct may be the
same, the determinative factor in the inquiry of whether one gets the
82
benefit of the Romeo and Juliet law is sexual orientation. Although
83
Limon recognized a valid purpose for the Romeo and Juliet law, he
argued that imposing harsher punishments based on sexual
orientation does not advance legitimate state interests in promoting
84
morality or protecting children.
Limon next reasoned that states cannot promote morality by
85
punishing people for who they are. While a state is
free to legislate to encourage people to act in ways the [s]tate
believes are morally good and to discourage people from acting in
ways the [s]tate believes are morally bad . . . it may not penalize
one group of citizens more severely for the same acts merely

79

Id. at 4.
Id. at 10.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
The Romeo and Juliet law’s main purpose is “[t]o recognize the judgment that
consensual sexual activity between a young adult and a not-quite adult, although
wrong, is not as criminal as sexual activity between persons farther apart in age.” Id.
at 7a.
84
Brief for Petitioner at 13, Limon (No. 00CR36).
85
Id. at 13 (citing various cases).
80
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because it disapproves of who they are; and it may not avoid the
Equal Protection Clause by saying that its disapproval is based in
86
morality.

Limon submitted a brief seeking certiorari to the United States
87
Supreme Court on October 10, 2002. The case remained dormant
until June 27, 2003. One day after the Lawrence decision, the United
States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to the Court of
88
Appeals of Kansas “for further consideration . . . .” Some viewed this
action as “the first ripple effect of [a] landmark decision on gay
89
rights.” In spite of this optimism, in January 2004, the Kansas Court
90
of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed Limon’s conviction. The
Kansas Court of Appeals held that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Lawrence did not apply to sexual acts involving children
91
and that the court must grant deference to the legislature. The
American Civil Liberties Union appealed the decision to the Kansas
92
93
Supreme Court, which granted review on May 24, 2004.
How the Kansas Supreme Court will ultimately decide Limon and
what impact Lawrence will have on it remains to be seen. One
prediction is that Lawrence will not affect Limon at all, since Lawrence
was decided on different grounds than those challenged in the Limon
94
case, granting a right to privacy only to consenting adults. Another
prediction is that the Limon case will be greatly affected since
95
Lawrence has “opened new doors” to many gay rights issues.

86

Id. at 14 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)). Prior to the Lawrence decision,
there was a split in the lower courts over whether moral disapproval of homosexuality
is a legitimate basis for discriminating. The Lawrence decision resolves that split. The
Kansas Court of Appeals relied on Bowers, now overruled, and held: “The impact of
Bowers on [this] case is obvious . . . . [T]here is no denial of equal protection when
[homosexual] behavior is criminalized or treated differently.” Id. at 23.
87
Id.
88
539 U.S. 955 (2003).
89
Charles Lane, Gay Rights Ruling Affects Kan. Case; 17-Year Term in Teen Sex Case at
Issue, WASH. POST, June 28, 2003, at A08. See also Greenhouse, supra note 14 (“In an
immediate application of its new protective approach to gay rights, the Supreme
Court today vacated the sodomy conviction of a Kansas teenager who received a 17year sentence for having oral sex with a younger boy.”).
90
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229.
91
Id.
92
Landau, supra note 11, at 16.
93
See supra note 38.
94
See infra Part IV.
95
Waldmeir, supra note 4, at 16.
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III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Lawrence is “touted as the most important case for gay rights in a
96
generation.”
It became the turning point in the Limon case,
97
initiating its remand. The Court of Appeals of Kansas, in deciding
Limon, based its reasoning on the Bowers principal—that there is no
98
fundamental right to engage in homosexual acts. The significance
99
of Lawrence lies in its reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick. Therefore any
discussion of Lawrence must begin with an examination of that case.
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
100

In Bowers v. Hardwick,
considered by some as an
101
“embarrassment,” the Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing
102
consensual sodomy and ruled that homosexuals do not have a
103
fundamental right to privacy. In 1986, the State of Georgia charged
104
Hardwick with violating its criminal sodomy statute after Georgia
police discovered him in the bedroom of his home with another
105
adult male.
Following a preliminary hearing, the district attorney
106
decided not to prosecute the case. Hardwick, however, brought suit
in federal district court in Georgia, challenging the constitutionality
107
of the statute that criminalized consensual sodomy.
Hardwick argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it
108
placed him, as a homosexual, in imminent danger of arrest.
The
district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
109
state a claim. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
statute violated Hardwick’s fundamental rights because his
96

Mary Alice Robbins, High Court Set for Bowers Challenge, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Mar. 24, 2003.
97
Appeal Begins for Teen Sentences to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36.
98
Brief for Petitioner at 11a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
99
478 U.S. 186.
100
Id.
101
See Robbins, supra note 96 (quoting Vivian Berger, professor emeritus at
Columbia University Law School); see also Elmer, supra note 1, at 5 (“Bowers v.
Hardwick, a dreadful ruling that easily earned its place in the pantheon of the all-time
worst Supreme Court decisions, along with such other notable cases as Dred Scott v.
Sanford . . . Plessy v. Ferguson . . . [and] Lochner v. New York . . . .”).
102
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
103
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
104
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2.
105
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
106
Id. at 188.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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homosexual activity is “private and intimate association that is beyond
the reach of state regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment and
110
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The
111
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a 5-4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
112
Court of Appeals.
The Court addressed the controversial issue of
whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy, thus making Georgia’s criminal
113
sodomy statute invalid.
Taking into consideration a deep-rooted
historical and religious sentiment against sodomy, and after listing
every state’s current legislation on this topic, the Court held that
there is no fundamental right to engage in acts of consensual
114
sodomy.
The Court justified this ruling as necessary because “it
would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery,
incest, and other sexual crimes . . . . [The Court is] unwilling to start
115
down that road.”
Justice Blackmun’s dissent provided a contrary view, recognizing
that the case was not about a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, but rather “‘the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be
116
117
let alone.’”
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent, in which he
pointed to a paradox—“our prior cases thus establish that a State may
not prohibit sodomy within ‘the sacred precincts of marital
118
119
bedrooms,’ or, indeed, between unmarried heterosexual adults.”
110

Id. at 189.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189. The Supreme Court granted certiorari “because other
Courts of Appeals have arrived at judgments contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit.”
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 190.
114
Id. at 193-94.
115
Id. at 195-96; see id. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
underscore my view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a
fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy . . . . To hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast
aside millennia of moral teaching.”). See further id. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring)
(“I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a
fundamental right.”). This policy argument, not to extend this rationale out of fear
where it may lead, is seen again in Lawrence: “This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky
grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.” 539 U.S. at 601
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
116
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United
States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
117
Id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall).
118
Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
111
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Using this precedent, the Justice reasoned that it is rational to extend
120
Justice Stevens
this protection to homosexual adults as well.
argued, “it is perfectly clear that the State of Georgia may not totally
prohibit the conduct proscribed by § 16-6-2 of the Georgia Criminal
121
122
Code.”
The majority’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas mostly
referenced Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bowers.
B. Bowers Overruled
123

Commentators viewed Lawrence v. Texas as a “landmark victory”
124
for gay rights that is “likely to become a milestone in U.S. law and
125
culture.”
The case began almost by accident when Harris County
Sheriff’s officers entered an apartment in Houston, looking for what
126
a neighbor had told them was a man with a gun “going crazy.”
Instead, the officers found Lawrence engaging in sexual activities
127
with Garner.
The police arrested the two men, held them in
overnight custody, and charged and later convicted them of violating
a Texas statute that prohibits sexual activity between members of the
128
same sex.
The two men sought a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal
479, 485 (1965)).
119
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)).
120
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121
Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
122
539 U.S. 558.
123
Id.
124
Lane, supra note 31, at A01.
125
Joan Biskupic, Decision Represents an Enormous Turn in the Law, U.S.A. TODAY,
June 26, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5314286; see also Lane, supra note 31, at A01
(stating:
A court that charts a conservative path in so many areas of law reversed
a 1986 decision that had hung darkly over the lives of gay men and
lesbians—and reversed it with stunning vigor . . . . The ruling was
anything but the narrow, cautious result many had expected in one of
the most sensitive cases of the term. Its logic seemed to be not just that
the Constitution prohibits the government from regulating
homosexual activity, but that the Constitution protects any sexual
activity between consenting adults, unless the government can show
that it has a legitimate interest in controlling it.).
126
Lane, supra note 31, at A01.
127
Id.
128
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a)). TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a “person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex,” and §
21.01(1) defines “deviate sexual intercourse” as “(A) any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”
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Court, challenging the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of similar provisions in the
129
Texas Constitution.
The Texas Court of Appeals rejected both
130
A Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard the federal
claims.
131
constitutional arguments of Lawrence and Garner.
In a divided
opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed
132
the convictions.
The United States Supreme Court then granted
133
certiorari.
The Court considered three questions upon review of the case:
(1) whether the Texas law criminalizing sexual intimacy by same-sex
couples violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; (2) whether the petitioners’ criminal convictions for
adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violated their liberty
and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
134
Amendment; and (3) whether Bowers v. Hardwick
should be
135
overruled.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy analyzed the case using
136
only the Due Process Clause.
The opinion explored the evolving
case history of the right to privacy, beginning with Griswold v.
137
Connecticut, which established a right of marital privacy in the
138
139
The Court then turned to Eisenstadt v. Baird, which
bedroom.
140
extended this right beyond the marital relationship.
Next, the
141
Court cited Roe v. Wade, which extended Due Process protection to
142
women by giving them the right to make fundamental decisions.

129

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 536. Ruth Harlow, lead attorney for Lawrence and
Garner, and legal director for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund said:
“We’re pursuing this case because they were just astounded that the state of Texas
could do this to them.” Robbins, supra note 96.
130
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
131
The two constitutional claims were Equal Protection and Due Process.
132
Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001).
133
537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
134
478 U.S. 186.
135
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
136
“We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.” Id. at 564.
137
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
138
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
139
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
140
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438).
141
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
142
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113).
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Lastly, the Court relied on Carey v. Population Services International,
which addressed a statute forbidding sale or distribution of
144
contraceptives to persons under sixteen,
and held that the
reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection of the
145
rights of married adults. Based on this line of reasoning, the Court
146
concluded that Garner and Lawrence deserve the same protection.
The Court reasoned that if sodomy is legal between two consenting
married adults, it must also be legal for non-married adults, including
147
homosexuals.
After analyzing this case development, the Court presented
evidence showing that the historical analysis on which the Bowers
148
Court based its decision had changed drastically. After a critique of
Bowers, the Court concluded that its rationale does not “withstand
careful analysis” and ruled that “Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
149
precedent . . . . [It] should be and now is overruled.”
Justice O’Connor, a member of the Bowers majority, wrote a
separate concurring opinion. She agreed with the judgment “that
Texas’ sodomy law banning ‘deviate sexual intercourse’ between
consenting adults of the same sex, but not between consenting adults
150
of different sexes, is unconstitutional.”
However, rather than
relying on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, as the
majority did, Justice O’Connor based her conclusion on the
151
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.

143

431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. 678).
145
Id. at 566.
146
See id. at 579 (“The case . . . involve[s] two adults who . . . engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect
for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
147
See id. at 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this [sexual and relationship] choice.”).
148
The Court cited the American Law Institute as well as European sources
invalidating these types of sodomy laws. In addition, the Court put forth statistics
showing that the twenty-four states with laws prohibiting this conduct at the time of
Bowers have now been reduced to thirteen, four of which only enforce their laws
against homosexual conduct. See id. at 569-74. Further, even in these states, people
are not commonly prosecuted. See id. at 573.
149
Id. at 577-78 (adding, in light of the harsh criticism of Bowers, that “[t]he
present case does not involve minors . . . . The case does involve two adults . . . .” Id. at
578 (emphasis added)).
150
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Georgia statute
criminalizes all sodomy. Id.
151
Id. at 579-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
144

2004

COMMENT

375

C. Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence and Limon
Because Matthew Limon brought an Equal Protection challenge,
the majority’s Due Process decision in Lawrence is not directly on
point. Thus, in Limon’s case, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lawrence may be the most pertinent part of the opinion because it
addresses Equal Protection. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor
agreed with the majority that Texas’s sodomy law is
152
unconstitutional.
As stated previously, however, rather than
analyzing the case in terms of Due Process, as the majority did, Justice
O’Connor based her conclusion on the Equal Protection Clause of
153
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice O’Connor began her opinion by noting that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “all
154
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
Next, using a
rational basis standard of review, Justice O’Connor stated that
“legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
155
state interest.” Justice O’Connor further explained that “[w]hen a
law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we
have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
156
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”
The Justice
remarked that, as a general rule, the Court will apply rational basis
review and hold a law unconstitutional where it inhibits personal
157
relationships. Thus, she concluded, “Texas’ sodomy law would not
pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the
158
type of rational basis review that we apply.”
Justice O’Connor had two main reasons to support her
conclusion. First, she reasoned that because the Texas statute makes
sodomy a crime only if the actors are of the same sex, it proves that
Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the sexual
159
orientation of the participants.
Second, Justice O’Connor
distinguished Lawrence from Bowers, asserting that moral disapproval
is an insufficient governmental interest to satisfy rational basis review

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 579-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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160

under the Equal Protection Clause.
Because Texas banned only
homosexual sodomy and not heterosexual sodomy, Justice O’Connor
concluded that Texas, in effect, was acting solely out of moral
disapproval of a politically unpopular group.
It would seem that an application of Justice O’Connor’s Equal
Protection analysis to Limon would lead to the conclusion that the
Kansas Romeo and Juliet law is unconstitutional. As in Lawrence,
Limon involves a much harsher penalty based solely on the sex of the
participants, and the state relies on moral disapproval as a legitimate
state interest to justify that penalty. Justice O’Connor, however,
cautioned:
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not
mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as
national security or preserving the traditional institution of
161
marriage.

Thus, Justice O’Connor declared that such statutes, which
distinguish between homosexuals and heterosexuals, are not invalid
per se, as long as they serve some legitimate state interest. As a result,
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, while influential, is not completely
applicable to the Limon case because she differentiated this law from
other circumstances where the law may be valid; for instance, laws
162
involving minors.
Further, even if applicable, Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion is not binding precedent because it is not the
majority opinion.

160

Id. at 582-83 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
162
Lawrence also had a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) argued that the majority’s opinion is false because
Texas’s prohibition of sodomy neither infringes upon a “fundamental right,” nor is it
unsupported by a rational relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate
state interest. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594-99 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Further, Justice
Scalia disagreed with Justice O’Connor, claiming that the Texas statute does not
deny equal protection under the laws. Id. at 604-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Most
interestingly, Justice Scalia remarks that “[t]oday’s opinion is the product of a Court,
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the socalled homosexual agenda . . . .” Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
also filed a dissent, remarking that this law is “uncommonly silly” and if it were up to
him, he would repeal it; however, his dissent lies with the fact that there is no right to
privacy in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161
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IV. LIMON AND LAWRENCE: A COMPARISON
Because Justice O’Connor based her opinion in Lawrence on
Equal Protection, it appears more on point than the majority’s Due
Process analysis, and thus is more favorable to Limon’s case; yet, it is
important to note that it is a concurrence, and not binding
163
precedent. Because the Lawrence majority based its opinion on due
164
process, liberty and privacy rather than on equal protection, the
precise effect the Lawrence decision will have on Limon, an equal
165
While Lawrence undoubtedly
protection case, remains to be seen.
166
167
helps Limon and gay rights in general, the due process and
privacy arguments, on their own merit, are unlikely to justify his
168
release. As attorney Joseph Landau indicated, “[The] Kansas court
was able to ignore the clear intention of the Lawrence ruling because,
whereas Lawrence was decided on privacy grounds, Limon involved
169
equal protection.” Further, he noted:
[T]he ACLU . . . did not assert the due process privacy right at
the core of Lawrence, as doing so would have required challenging
163

See Tjagsa Practice Note: Criminal Law Notes: Instructors, The Judge Advocate General
School, 1992 ARMY LAW. 33, 34 (discussing United States v. Alexander, 34 M.J. 121
(C.M.A. 1992), where after the Court of Military Appeals granted review, the Court
“ultimately declined to decide the case on that basis.” Instead, “Chief Judge Sullivan
and Senior Judge Everett found that the evidence was admissible as the product of a
search supported by probable cause. This result is unfortunate. A decision on the
granted issue would have provided practitioners with unequivocal guidance about
MRE 313(b) and the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard.” Id. at 34. The
author adds, “Nevertheless, the Court of Military Appeals’ decision in Alexander is
worth examining because Judge Cox did decide the granted issue in his concurring
opinion. Although this opinion is not binding precedent, it is remarkable in its
approach.”). See also Major Edward J. Kinberg, USALSA REPORT: Hindsight—
Litigation That Might Be Avoided, 1989 ARMY LAW. 26, 30 (“While Judge Riismandel’s
concurring opinion may not be binding precedent, it certainly gives an idea of where
the board may be heading in the future.”). Further, Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion carries little precedential effect, since she was the sixth justice to vote against
the Texas statute, and her vote was not required in overruling Bowers.
164
“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 575.
165
Some commentators opine that the due process claim is broader than the
equal protection, see infra note 304 and accompanying text.
166
Lawrence is helpful since it overruled Bowers, as well as giving Limon “a new
avenue to appeal his 17-year sentence.” Robert B. Bluey, Kansas Man Tests Supreme
Court’s Sodomy Ruling (Oct. 27, 2003), at
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=\Culture\archive\200310\CUL20031
027a.html.
167
See supra text accompanying note 6.
168
See infra text accompanying note 177.
169
Landau, supra note 11.
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the entire statutory rape law. Instead, it sought only to challenge
the law’s discriminatory application, arguing that the statute
violated the boy’s rights to equal protection. But this rationale
170
handed Kansas an easy, if disingenuous, escape hatch.

This “escape hatch” is obvious in the Limon opinion, where the
court pointed out, “Limon is not asserting a Lawrence−like due
process challenge. Instead, Limon makes an equal protection
challenge . . . , [and] the law and facts are distinguishable from
171
Lawrence.”
It is difficult to say what effect Lawrence may have on Limon’s
case in the Kansas Supreme Court. While the Court in Lawrence
relied on “fundamental propositions and discussions,” it never
declared that homosexual sodomy is a “fundamental right,” nor did it
subject the Texas law to a strict scrutiny standard of review that would
otherwise have been appropriate if sodomy was a fundamental
172
173
right.
Thus, categorizing Lawrence as a “landmark” decision may
have been inappropriate. Rather, as many analysts realize, “Lawrence
is emerging as a far less revolutionary legal precedent than first
174
advertised . . . .”
Consequently, Lawrence may not support Limon’s
equal protection case after all.
Furthermore, while overruling Bowers, “the Court leaves
175
strangely untouched its central legal conclusion,” specifically, what
standard of scrutiny should apply to such laws. The majority’s due
process analysis in Lawrence, as well as Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence, does not actually address Limon’s equal protection
176
argument.
In fact, there are various differences between Lawrence
170

Id.
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234-35.
172
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173
See Elmer, supra note 1.
174
Warren Richey, Gay Rights No Easy Sell in Courts; Despite High-Profile Victories, GayRights Activists Have Lost Most Recent Cases, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 9, 2004,
available at http://lgrl.sitestreet.com/news/article.asp?id=1144.
175
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176
Limon is challenging the Kansas statute based on equal protection. See supra
text accompanying notes 75-77. In Lawrence, while the
equal protection argument seems very simple at first . . . the Texas
statute violates the equal protection clause because it criminalizes
identical conduct when engaged in by same-sex couples but not when
engaged in by opposite-sex couples. But the argument is not so simple
at all. Gays are not a suspect class, and it was not at all clear that
discrimination against gays would be subjected to heightened scrutiny
under equal-protection analysis . . . the right to commit homosexual
sodomy is not [a fundamental liberty interest]. If subjected to the
lowest-level rational-relationship test, it is easy to imagine the High
Court (or any court) conjuring excuses that anti-sodomy laws are
171
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and Limon, which have led Kansas to argue that Lawrence is not
177
Lawrence involved two consenting
controlling on Limon’s case.
178
179
180
adults, acting in private. Limon involved a minor under the age
181
182
of legal consent, thus unable to consent, acting in a public
183
facility.
Such differences have already become a barrier to Limon,
184
as the Court stressed several of these distinctions.
Further, while
185
many gay rights victories stemmed from the Lawrence decision, a
186
backlash is predicted.
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Elmer, supra note 1, at 6.
177
“[T]he present case is legally distinguishable from Lawrence . . . . [T]he
Lawrence Court declared that private consensual homosexual acts between adults are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . . Limon makes an
Equal Protection challenge . . . . As a result, the law and facts are distinguishable
from Lawrence.” Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234-35.
178
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The case does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.”).
179
Id. (“The present case does not . . . involve public conduct . . . .”).
180
Brief for Petitioner at 3a, Limon (No. 00CR36).
181
M.A.R. was just short of fifteen years of age. Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon
(No. 00CR36). Sixteen is the “age of consent” in Kansas. United States v. Kelly, No.
99-10100-01-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5293, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2000).
182
See infra text accompanying note 225.
183
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
184
See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
185

The historic chain of events - equally stunning to conservative forces began in June, when the Supreme Court overturned Texas’ antisodomy law, in effect decriminalizing gay sex in the last 13 states where
such laws were on the books. Over the next few months, the Episcopal
Church consecrated an openly gay bishop; Wal-Mart, the country’s
largest private employer, extended its anti-discrimination policy to gays
and lesbians; Bride’s magazine featured its first article on same-sex
weddings; California lawmakers granted same-sex couples nearly all the
rights of married spouses; and Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court
ruled gays had a constitutional right to marry.
Associated Press, David Crary, Gains for Gay-Rights Movement, WOODLAND DAILY
DEMOCRAT (Dec. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.dailydemocrat.com/articles/2003/12/27/news/news9_.txt.
186
See id.
Even while anticipating bitter struggles ahead, particularly over
marriage, gay-rights activists interpreted the events as a sign that most
of their goals would be achieved, and sooner rather than later. Foes of
gay rights, conversely, hoped the landmark court rulings would
provoke a backlash that at minimum would thwart recognition of samesex marriages.
Id; see also Laura Douglas-Brown, ‘Unprecedented’ Court Victories Mark 2003, Backlash
Builds Support for Constitutional Ban of Gay Marriage, WASH. BLADE, Jan. 2, 2004, at
http://www.washblade.com/2004/1-2/news/national/victories.cfm (“. . . [B]acklash
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A. First Signs of Backlash
Gay-rights activists hoped that the Lawrence v. Texas decision
“would mark a turning point in the fight to end what they . . . [saw] as
187
the second-class status of homosexuals in America.” However, only
eight months after the infamous decision, one observer noted:
“Lawrence is emerging as a far less revolutionary legal precedent than
first advertised . . . . Lower courts have issued [several] rulings since
188
Furthermore,
Lawrence, but only one was a victory for gay rights.”
189
that victory, Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, which required
recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, was not even
based on a newly recognized right post-Lawrence, but rather, on a
190
broad reading of the state constitution.
While the Massachusetts
case is a great victory, in the broader scheme, “other judges who have
been asked to apply—and expand upon—the Lawrence precedent
191
have been anything but friendly to gay rights.” Rather, “in spite of
the Massachusetts ruling, it is becoming increasingly clear to
advocates and critics alike that Lawrence has not launched a straight192
line march toward expansion of gay rights through litigation.”
Recent lower court decisions that “limit or criticize Lawrence are
beginning to suggest a more complicated path ahead for gay rights
advocates, with detours and reversals likely—along with victories like
193
the one in Massachusetts.”
Whereas Goodridge was viewed as the first post-Lawrence victory,
194
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services was
195
seen as Lawrence’s first “setback.”
In Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit
to the sodomy decision began just days after the Supreme Court heard arguments in
the case on March 26.”).
187
Richey, supra note 174.
188
Id.
189
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Tony Mauro, Rocky Path for Gay Rights
Cases Despite Lawrence; High Court Logic in Landmark Ruling Rejected by Kansas, Florida
Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at 1 (“The first post-Lawrence decision that seemed
to justify that optimism came last November when the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that the state’s bar
against same-sex marriage could not be constitutionally justified. Lawrence was cited
repeatedly in that decision.”).
190
Richey, supra note 174.
191
Id.
192
Mauro, supra note 189.
193
Id. Further, in the post-Lawrence regime, there is even more of a conservative
push in issuing an amendment to the Constitution limiting marriage to opposite sex.
See Carl Hulse, Senate Hears Testimony on a Gay Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2004, at 26.
194
358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
195
Mauro, supra note 189, at 1.
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Court of Appeals upheld Florida’s ban on the adoption of foster care
196
The plaintiffs challenged the Florida
children by homosexuals.
statute on two grounds: Lawrence’s right to privacy and Equal
197
Protection.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, unanimously rejected
both claims, interpreting Lawrence narrowly and differentiating the
198
case from Lawrence because Lofton involved minors.
Further, the
Eleventh Circuit criticized Lawrence in detail stating, “We are
particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest from
an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with
199
Even further, the Eleventh
standard fundamental-rights analysis.”
Circuit charged that the “constitutional liberty interests on which the
[Lawrence] Court relied were invoked, not with ‘careful description,’
200
but with sweeping generality.”
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit not only interpreted Lawrence
201
narrowly,
but also rejected the notion that Lawrence granted
202
homosexuals a fundamental right.
Further, the Eleventh Circuit
203
held that Lawrence only required a rational basis standard of review,
reasoning that the case involved minors as the basis to distinguish it
204
from Lawrence. Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit gave great deference to
205
the legislature.
Two days following the Lofton decision “came another ruling that

196

358 F.3d 804.
Id. at 809.
198
Id. at 818.
Moreover, the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case.
Apart from the shared homosexuality component, there are marked
differences in the facts of the two cases. The Court itself stressed the
limited factual situation it was addressing in Lawrence [Court cites
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 – “The present case does not involve
minors.”]. Here, the involved actors are not only consenting adults,
but minors as well . . . . Hence, we conclude that the Lawrence decision
cannot be extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual
persons.
Id. at 817; see also Mauro, supra note 189.
199
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817; see also Mauro, supra note 189.
200
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
201
The Lofton court interpreted Lawrence as simply holding that “substantive due
process does not permit a state to impose a criminal prohibition on private
consensual homosexual conduct. The effect of this holding was to establish a greater
respect than previously existed in the law for the right of consenting adults to engage
in private sexual conduct.” Id. at 815-16.
202
Id. at 816 (“Nowhere, however, did the Court characterize this right as
‘fundamental.’”).
203
Id. at 817.
204
See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
205
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 827.
197
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gave Lawrence a short shrift, this time from the Kansas Court of
206
207
This decision was Kansas v. Limon.
In this case, as in
Appeals.”
Lofton, the Kansas Court of Appeals interpreted Lawrence narrowly,
echoing the distinction made in Lofton that the law applies differently
208
to minors than it does to adults.
B. Limon: Adults vs. Minors
In Lawrence, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court
recognized a privacy right for homosexuals to engage in homosexual
209
activities. The Court, however, stipulated that this privacy right only
210
extends to “consenting adults.”
Thus, one could make the
211
argument that Lawrence grants a privacy right only to adults.
This
suggests an argument that Lawrence, by specifically excluding minors,
has no impact whatsoever on Limon, a case dealing with underage
212
sex.
This movement, limiting Lawrence to situations involving
adults, has already transpired in Lofton.
Additionally, the Kansas Court of Appeals latest Limon decision
relied on this distinction. The Court of Appeals began its analysis by
focusing on Justice Kennedy’s language in Lawrence: “The case does
involve two adults, who with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
213
lifestyle.”
Next, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Lawrence’s
“major premise may be reconstructed to state: All adults may legally
engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a

206

Mauro, supra note 189, at 1.
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229.
208
Mauro, supra note 189.
209
See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
210
“The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.” Id. at 578
(emphasis added).
211
“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused . . . . The case does involve two adults . . . .” Id. at 578
(emphasis added).
212
As University of California at Los Angeles law professor Eugene Volokh
opined, “[i]f states have flexibility in deciding what is permitted for adults, it seems
to me that they would, as a constitutional matter, have even more flexibility in what is
permitted with children.” Homosexuals Ask Supreme Court to Strike Down Homo
“Pedophile” Laws, THE WELCH REP., Oct. 14, 2002, at
Therefore, because
http://www.welchreport.com/pastnews_c.cfm?rank=523.
Limon’s case involves a minor, Limon may not receive the privacy protection that has
been granted in Lawrence. Specifically, the fact that the Court mentioned such a
caveat shows that the Lawrence “victory” may not encompass Limon.
213
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234.
207
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214

homosexual lifestyle.”
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded,
215
Lastly, the Kansas
“Children are excluded from the proposition.”
court emphasized that “[b]ecause the present case involved a 14-year216
old . . . child, it is factually distinguishable from Lawrence.”
The Kansas Court of Appeals further justified Limon’s
conviction, noting that the unequal position of children, both
physically and mentally, “make them a proper subject for legislative
217
protection.”
The Court of Appeals emphasized that even laws
operating in the “sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights”
have been sustained when they were “aimed at protecting the physical
218
and emotional well-being of youth.”
Drawing from cases such as
219
Prince v. Massachusetts where the United States Supreme Court held
a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature on the
street was valid notwithstanding the statute’s effect on a First
220
Amendment activity,
the Court of Appeals concluded that
“[p]rotective legislation is permissible even though based on a
221
classification which may seem unreasonable.”
Using this rationale, the Kansas Court of Appeals added that
through the legislature’s passing of the criminal sodomy statute and
punishing homosexual teenage sex more severely than teenage
heterosexual acts, it has acted reasonably as to prevent gradual
deterioration of sexual morality, encourage and preserve traditional
sexual mores of society, and not disturb traditional sexual
222
developments of children.
The Court of Appeals essentially
interpreted Limon’s case in the same way it did before Lawrence. In
fact, the Court of Appeals construed Justice Kennedy’s language in
Lawrence as a limitation, barring Limon’s release.
214

Id.
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 235.
218
Id. at 236.
219
310 U.S. 158 (1944).
220
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 236. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 75657 (1982) (“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in
‘safeguarding the physical and physiological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”)
(citations omitted); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (sustaining a New
York law protecting children from exposure to non-obscene literature).
221
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 236.
222
Id. Further, the Court disapproved of Limon’s Brief, which marked M.A.R. as
a homosexual or bisexual. The Court asserted that this label is “unfair” because the
record reveals that he had only one same-sex encounter with Limon. The Court
added, “[I]f M.A.R.’s sexual identity was not well defined before his homosexual
encounter with Limon, M.A.R. might have become confused about his sexual
identify.” Id. at 266-67.
215
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C. Limon; consent
Likewise, by limiting this privacy right to adults, the Supreme
Court in Lawrence essentially requires consent. While consent is
presumed when the actors are adults, in cases involving children,
223
consent is not presumed.
Further, the Supreme Court notes that
the Bowers Court employed flawed reasoning because early sodomy
laws were not enforced against consenting adults acting in private,
but “[i]nstead, sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts
against those who could not or did not consent [such as]: relations
between men and minor girls, [and] between adults involving
224
force . . . .”
By distinguishing between different levels of consent,
the Supreme Court is essentially awarding preferential treatment to
consensual relationships. This distinction is crucial to Limon’s case,
since M.A.R., who was under the age of sixteen, could not legally have
225
formed the requisite consent.
However, while there are different considerations as to consent,
the same basic issue underlies both cases: Kansas and Texas punish
the same sexual act differently based solely on the sexual orientation
226
of the participants.
In both Limon and Lawrence, the defendants
227
In Lawrence, this was
sought equal punishments for equal crimes.
achieved through the privacy protection of the Fourteenth
228
229
Amendment.
Limon argued an Equal Protection violation.
Nevertheless, both cases essentially pose the same issue, leading to
223

See infra Part V.B discussing consent.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561.
225
“[A] minor [is] therefore incapable of consent.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569. See
also discussion of consent infra Part V.
226
Limon’s attorney, Tamara Lange of the ACLU, pronounced, “[T]he case
presents the same equal protection question that was central to the Lawrence
decision.” Bluey, supra note 166. Ms. Lange stated further, “The Supreme Court
made it very clear that you can no longer punish someone differently for being
gay . . . . Yet Matthew Limon continues to sit in jail because when he was a teenager
he had consensual sex with another male rather than a female.” Appeal Begins for
Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36.
227
Lange [Limon’s attorney] said the issue comes down to fairness,
something the Kansas law did not afford to Limon. She said it would
be outlandish for a judge to sentence a homosexual teenager to a
stiffer sentence than a heterosexual teenager if each robbed the same
convenience store. If that is the case . . . there is no reason to impose a
tougher sentence on Limon for having had sex. “It’s really about
having equal punishment for equal crimes . . . . If you perform the
same acts, you should have the same penalty.”
Robert B. Bluey, Homosexuals Ask Supreme Court to Strike Down ‘Anti-Gay’ Laws (Oct. 14,
2002) at http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/200210/CUL20021014a.html.
228
See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
229
Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Limon (No. 00CR36).
224
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the inquiry of whether the Lawrence decision directs Limon’s release.
While in both cases the defendants filed a petition for certiorari
230
to the United States Supreme Court, the Court granted a writ in
231
Lawrence only. The essential holding of Lawrence is that consenting
232
adults have a privacy right to engage in homosexual acts. On first
appearance, this does not encompass Limon, where one of the
233
participants was a minor and thus could not consent. However, the
Court clearly recognized the possible effect of Lawrence on Limon by
remanding the Limon case to the Kansas Court of Appeals just one
234
day after deciding Lawrence. In fact, the Supreme Court met for this
235
particular purpose. This was seen by some as “the first ripple effect”
236
of Lawrence.
The Court’s action poses one question—why? If Lawrence, as the
Court stated on several occasions, does not extend a privacy right to
minors, why give Limon a second chance? One opinion is that the
Court “clearly felt . . . that a great deal of injustice has been done to
Matthew Limon . . . . [L]aws that punish lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people far more harshly than heterosexuals for the same thing are
237
simply discriminatory and wrong . . . .”
Another possibility is that
the United States Supreme Court merely sent the case back because
the Kansas district court based its reasoning in Limon on the Bowers
238
decision, which had just been overruled. Lastly, perhaps the Court
230

Id. at 23; Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
232
See generally id.
233
“‘The Supreme Court’s decision had to do with consenting adults,’ [said
Miami County Attorney David Miller]. ‘The victim in this case was not of age to give
consent.’” Tom Rizzo, U.S. Supreme Court Remands Kansas Case Involving Underage, Gay
Sex, KAN. CITY STAR, June 28, 2003, at 1.
234
539 U.S. 955 (2003).
235
“The Supreme Court came in for a special session to order this review the day
after the Texas (and Kansas) sodomy laws were deemed unconstitutional . . . .”
Richard Heckler, Kline’s Tantrum, TOPEKA CAP. –J. (Kan.), Sept. 18, 2003, at 4,
available at 2003 WL 62492681. “The order was made in light of Thursday’s ruling
that struck down Texas’ same-sex sodomy law, the Supreme Court announced. It was
the only such order issued Friday, according to a court spokesman.” Rizzo, supra
note 233.
236
“The Supreme Court announced yesterday the first ripple effect of its
landmark decision on gay rights, ordering a Kansas court to reconsider its approval
of a 17-year sentence . . . .” Lane, supra note 89.
237
Dick Kurtenbach, Executive Director of the ACLU of Kansas and Western
Missouri, opined this comment, see Court Asked to Overturn 17-Year Prison Sentence of Bi
Teen (Aug. 11, 2003), at
http://www.365gay.com/NewsContent/081103romeoLaw.htm.
238
“‘The Kansas court justified Matthew’s conviction on the basis that the
Supreme Court had upheld anti-gay sodomy laws in its 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick
231
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acknowledged the significance and possible implications of Justice
O’Connor’s Equal Protection concurrence.
Whatever its reasoning, the United States Supreme Court has
given Matthew Limon, who has already served over three years of his
239
seventeen-year sentence, “hope” for a release. It remains to be seen
if Limon has more than a hope in the aftermath of Lawrence, as
Lawrence, after all, left many questions unanswered.
V. POST-LAWRENCE—REMAINING QUESTIONS
Decisions following Lawrence, including Lofton and the Kansas
Court of Appeals decision on remand in Limon, reflect that although
the Lawrence case may have been a “breakthrough,” it is currently on
240
“shak[y] ground[s].” The language of the Lawrence decision itself is
241
David Garrow, a legal historian at Emory
partially to blame.
University observes, “What judges seem to be saying is that Justice
Kennedy may be too rhetorically poetic for his own good . . . . [I]t
may sound winsome as moral commentary, but as blackletter
242
constitutional law, [judges] are not impressed.”
Furthermore,
other than its “poetic” language, the opinion has other ambiguities,
leaving several unanswered questions, specifically in Limon’s case.
A. Minors
The Lawrence decision left various questions open. Some
advocate that the Supreme Court, by expressly stating that the privacy
right should be offered to adults, ensured that Limon, a case involving
243
teenagers, would not be affected.
In addition, proponents of the
Romeo and Juliet law argue that it is a legitimate law to protect
children; thus, the Kansas law has no relation to the law struck down

ruling,’ said Tamara Lange, Limon’s attorney from the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay
Rights Project. ‘Now that Bowers has been overturned, the Kansas Court of Appeals
should recognize that this young man should not spend more time in prison just
because he’s bisexual.’” Id.
239
Limon’s attorney, Tamara Lange of the ACLU, said: “[T]he fact that the
Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration should give Limon
hope he will be released . . . .” Bluey, supra note 166.
240
Mauro, supra note 189.
241
Id. (“[T]he criticism already leveled at Lawrence has some analysts wondering
whether the structure and language of Kennedy’s majority opinion invited attack.”).
242
Id.
243
See Bluey, supra note 166. “Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline has defended
Limon’s prosecution. He has the support of 25 state lawmakers who filed a friend-ofthe-court brief arguing that the Lawrence decision has nothing to do with pedophilia
or any other laws regulating sex between adults and minors.” Id.
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244

in Lawrence. If that is the case, it seems paradoxical for the United
245
A contrary
States Supreme Court to give Limon another chance.
opinion is that the Court, after overruling Bowers, simply remanded
the case not to grant Limon a second chance, but to allow the
246
appellate court to apply consistent precedent.
Thus, the weight
given to this particular point is unsettled.
A main argument for upholding Limon’s conviction is that he
247
engaged in this conduct with a minor.
Throughout the majority
and concurring opinions, the Supreme Court carefully noted that
248
A literal reading would imply
Lawrence did not extend to minors.
that Limon’s actions with M.A.R., a minor, are not protected, since
249
different standards apply when dealing with the conduct of minors.
244

See infra note 247 discussing differentiations between adults and minors.
The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to the Court
of Appeals of Kansas “for further consideration . . . .” Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955
(2003). See also Greenhouse, supra note 14. “In an immediate application of its
newly protective approach to gay rights, the Supreme Court today vacated the
sodomy conviction of a Kansas teenager.” Further, “in a one-sentence order, the
justices told the Kansas Court of Appeals to reconsider the conviction and sentence
in light of the Supreme Court ruling on Thursday that overturned a Texas sodomy
law.” Id.
246
See supra Part IV.C.
247
During oral arguments on December 3, 2003, Deputy Attorney General Jared
Maag argued “that the Legislature has the authority to determine the punishment
for minors who engage in sexual acts in order to teach moral values to children,
including ‘traditional family roles.’” Chris Grenz, Court Takes on Gay Teen Sex Case,
TOPEKA CAP. –J. (Kan.), Dec. 3, 2003, at 8, available at 2003 WL 62495800. Kansas
Attorney General, Phill Kline shares this viewpoint:
Kline said . . . that the American Civil Liberties Union is arguing that
teenagers have a constitutional right to have sexual relations with
anyone they want. [This] “is absolutely a remarkable assault on the
authority of the family because when your daughter walks out the door
and says, ‘I’m going to meet my 40-year-old boyfriend’ and you try to
guide her and parent her, and say, ‘No, that’s not going to happen’
and she holds up an ACLU card and says, ‘Call my attorney,’ we are
living in a different type of America.”
Grenz, supra note 50. Kline further stated that “if the state loses a sodomy case
currently before a state appeals court [i.e., Limon], Kansas marriage laws and laws
against sex with children will be nullified.” Associated Press, John Hanna, KANSAS:
Kline Says Marriage, Consent Laws in Danger; ACLU Disputes Claim (Sept. 16, 2003),
available at http://lgrl.sitestreet.com/news/print.asp?id=458.
248
Lawrence specifically stated, “This case does not involve minors, persons who
might be injured or coerced . . . . It does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.” Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
249
See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Further, just as states can justify
laws such as refusing to furnish alcohol to children but not adults, “lawmakers could
have several reasons for setting up different sodomy penalties.” Associated Press,
John Hanna, Kan. Court Backs Harsher Sodomy Sentence (Jan. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63810-2004Jan30.html.
245
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A more careful inquiry, however, may suggest that this literal
interpretation is not unquestionably what the Supreme Court
intended.
Courts generally recognize that minors enjoy fewer sexual rights
250
than adults. When the Lawrence Court stated the decision does not
extend to minors, it may simply have affirmed this general principle.
The Court reiterated that there is a privacy right to engage in
homosexual relationships in the home and that “the State cannot
demean their [homosexuals’] existence or control their destiny by
251
Yet, this does not
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”
252
mean that this protection must exclude teenagers.
While teenagers
may have no more privacy rights after Lawrence than before, the
Lawrence decision does not necessarily serve to limit minors’ rights.
Therefore, a state can still monitor and set up rules regulating
relationships between minors; however, homosexual minors may still
enjoy the benefits derived from this ruling. Prior to Lawrence,
homosexual activity was illicit and illegal. After Lawrence, homosexual
activity is neither and thus should not warrant stricter punishment.
Under this reading of Lawrence, Kansas can punish Limon for
engaging in consensual sexual behavior with a child under the Kansas
253
criminal sodomy statute, but may not punish him for longer than a
254
heterosexual teenager.
This, in essence, is the heart of Justice
O’Connor’s Equal Protection argument.
Thus, although Lawrence specifically addresses adults and seems
255
to exclude minors from the general decision, it is likely to support
Limon’s case, at least minimally. Although it is recognized that in
250

For the notion that minors do not enjoy a constitutional sexual privacy right is
quite common, see In re T.A.J., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). “Minors
have no privacy right to engage in consensual sexual intercourse . . . . [D]ue to age
and immaturity, minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that
take account of both immediate and long-range consequences.” Id. at 1361.
251
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
252
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
253
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (2002).
254
See Appeal Begins for Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36. Dick
Kurtenbach, Executive Director of the ACLU of Kansas and Western Missouri stated:
Contrary to Attorney General Phill Kline’s many efforts to confuse the
real issues behind this case, we’re not saying the state shouldn’t protect
teens or punish those who break the law. We are only asking that the
state treat gay teens the same as it does straight teens . . . . Matthew
Limon isn’t asking for a get out of jail free card – he’s saying he should
have been convicted and punished . . . [and received the same
protection under]– the Romeo and Juliet law.
Id.
255
See note 210 supra and accompanying text.

2004

COMMENT

389

general, minors have less privacy rights than adults, this does not
mean that the benefits homosexuals will receive from Lawrence
cannot extend to minors. While minors continue to possess less
sexual and privacy rights than adults, it does not necessarily follow
that only homosexual adults are free to engage in homosexual
conduct. Even though the Court stated that the decision does not
include minors, it did not say that the decision cannot include minors.
It is difficult to predict, however, how far courts will—and should—
extend these benefits. Nevertheless, it can be conceded that Limon’s
prospects seem greater post-Lawrence than in the Bowers regime.
B. Age of Consent
The next potential hurdle, also relating to the age of the
participants, is consent. The Court assumed consent was present in
256
Lawrence, however, in Limon, consent poses a problem. M.A.R., the
“victim,” was fifteen years of age. The age of consent in Kansas is
257
258
M.A.R. was under the age of consent, meaning that
sixteen.
259
although the acts were consensual,
M.A.R. could not have
260
effectively, or legally, “consented” to them.
Consent began as a legislative determination that established at
what age a female was capable of consenting to engage in sexual
261
acts.
Lawmakers enacted early statutory rape laws and age of
consent laws “to protect young females’ virginity in order to ensure
262
their eligibility for marriage.”
In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, “reformers and families used statutory rape laws
both to protect and to control the sexuality of working class girls

256

See note 232 supra and accompanying text.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
258
See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
259
See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
260
“Under the old statute and similar ones in other states, it has always been held
that the female child below the age prescribed is utterly without capacity to consent.”
State v. Frazier, 54 Kan. 719 (1895). Therefore, “there can be no such thing as
fornication with a female child under the age of consent . . . . If she cannot consent,
then any person lewdly touching her commits an assault, and an assault is always an
unlawful act.” Id.
261
See DONALD E.J. MACNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 67
(Free Press 1977) (“‘Statutory rape’ usually refers to . . . a consensual act in that
both parties agreed but one legally regarded as a form of rape because the age and
presumed immaturity of the female did not give her the legal right to offer
consent.”).
262
Britton Guerrina, Comment: Mitigating Punishment for Statutory Rape, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1251, 1259 (1998). See also Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.7
(1981).
257
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263

laboring in the new urban centers.”
The necessity for these laws,
however, is still present in modern times. Two policy goals explain
why legislatures retain a statutory age of consent: “(1) to prevent
teenage girls from consenting to sex in an uninformed manner,
thereby exposing themselves to physical and emotional harm; and (2)
to deter men from preying on young females and coercing them into
264
sexual relationships.”
Both of these goals seek to deter risks from
sexual relationships, such as pregnancy, disease, and emotional
265
harm.
To prevent such harms, age of consent laws serve as a
266
deterrent to older men from taking advantage of younger females.
Historically age of consent laws existed primarily to protect
young females. Prior to Lawrence, Kansas’s age of consent laws did
267
not explicitly encompass homosexuals.
Because homosexual
sodomy was illegal, neither adults nor teenagers could legally consent
to it. In the post-Lawrence regime, however, because sodomy is
effectively legal, the possibility exists that states can continue to
prevent homosexual conduct, at least for teenagers, through indirect
268
regulation, accomplished by enacting a higher age of consent.
Though sodomy is legal, by enacting a very high age of consent (i.e.,
twenty-one, as England and Australia have done), a state can
effectively preclude sodomy in a great part of its population. This
type of regulation, in operation, goes beyond simply “protecting
263

Guerrina, supra note 262, at 1259.
Id. at 1259-60.
265
Id. at 1260.
266
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
267
See chart of age of consent laws in the United States, at
http://www.ageofconsent.com/ageofconsent.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
268
As early as 1967, Europe, arguably more progressive than the United States in
terms of gay-rights (as cited in Lawrence, see note 148 supra and note 274 infra),
passed the Sexual Offences Act, making prohibitions on homosexual behavior
unenforceable. This Act applied only in England and Wales; Scotland joined in 1980
and Northern Ireland in 1982. At the time, the age of majority was eighteen; the age
of consent for heterosexuals was sixteen; the age of consent, however, for
homosexuals was twenty-one. For the first time since the Act of 1967, the issue of
consent was debated in 1994, when several nations lowered the age to eighteen. In
England, this issue is still being debated. See Arabella Thorp, ‘Age of Consent’ for Male
Homosexual Acts, Research Paper 98/68, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HOME AFFAIRS
SECTION, June 19, 1998, at 9, at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/
lib/research/rp98/rp98-068.pdf [hereinafter Research Paper]. The Research Paper
was prepared in response to Ann Keen’s proposed amendments to the Crime and
Disorder Bill [HL] [Bill 167 of 1997-98], which sought to lower the age of consent for
male homosexual acts from 18 to 16. This Research Paper discusses the amendments
to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which lowered the age of consent
from 21 to 18, and examines the events leading up to the changes proposed
currently. In addition, it also provides an overview of some of the issues that may
arise in considering lowering age of consent laws.
264
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269

children.”
By enacting a higher age of consent, a state aims to
prevent an activity it believes to be morally reprehensible. Such state
actions bear greater resemblance to the “embarrassing” era of Bowers
than to the current progressive Lawrence regime. Thus, Limon is
important, not only because it serves as a “test case” to see how far
270
Lawrence will extend, but also because it can serve as a preventative
measure against a backlash that could essentially outlaw homosexual
activities of young adults through the enactment of higher age of
271
consent laws. Further, this decision’s importance will be more than
experimental. In fact, “[a]dvocates and opponents of same-sex
sodomy laws agree on one thing: The [C]ourt’s ruling on the issue
could be a milestone in how sexual orientation and traditional views
272
The Limon
of marriage and family are treated under the law.”
decision could fill in the holes of Lawrence, addressing whether sexual
orientation deserves heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
273
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The European Model
A similar issue regarding homosexual consent laws has recently
274
been debated in Europe. While sodomy has been legal in Europe
269

See Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 235-37.
See supra note 89.
271
This possibility has been made apparent: in oral arguments to the Kansas
Court of Appeals on December 3, 2003, the Deputy attorney general argued that the
“[Legislature] has the right to set polices regarding teen sex – even if lawmakers treat
gays differently from heterosexuals.” Grenz, supra note 247. The Legislature has
“the authority to determine the punishment for minors who engage in sexual acts in
order to teach moral values to children, including ‘traditional family roles.’ . . .
[T]he different penalties for same-sex teenage couples would promote marriage,
encourage procreation and discourage the spread of disease.” Id.
272
Geraldine Sealey, Imprisoned Teen Challenges Kansas ‘Romeo and Juliet’ Law, ABC
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2003, at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/teensodomy030117.html.
273
“The Supreme Court has not reached the question of whether sexual
orientation warrants strict or intermediate scrutiny. Some have argued it serves
heightened scrutiny,’ said Ed Stein, a professor of sexual orientation, gender and the
law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York.” Id. See also Section C infra
discussing Romer.
274
While cases arising in and decided by European courts bear little precedential
value, European decisions may still carry some weight. The Court in Lawrence
engaged in a discussion over how Europe has treated homosexuals:
[A]lmost five years before Bowers was decided, the European Court of
Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today’s
case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a
practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual
homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that
right . . . . The court held [in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom] that the laws
270
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275

since 1967, some nations only recently lowered the age of consent
276
European
for homosexuals to the same age as for heterosexuals.
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention
on Human rights. Authoritative in all countries that are members of
the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision
is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was
insubstantial in our Western civilization.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (internal citations omitted).
275
Id. at 569-71.
276
Hungary: Paragraph 199 of the Hungarian Penal Code sets an age of consent of
eighteen for sexual relations between persons of the same sex, and 14 for those
between persons of the opposite sex. ILGA-Europe Welcomes Hungarian Constitutional
Court Age of Consent Ruling, Sept. 5, 2002, at http://www.ilgaeurope.org/m7/media_releases/2002-09-05-HUConsent.htm. It was repealed on
September 5, 2002. Id. The Code received challenges beginning in September 1993,
when three organizations (Lambda Budapest Gay Society, Homeros Society, and the
Hungarian Jewish Lesbian and Gay Group) addressed a petition to the
Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the law. Id. Challenges
continued in 1996 and in 1998, and three cases since 1998. However the
Constitutional Court repeatedly postponed reaching a decision. Id.
In 2000 the issue was taken up at European level, when the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a
Recommendation calling inter alia for the repeal of remaining
discriminatory age of consent laws in Europe, and citing Hungary
amongst the countries which still maintained such laws.
The
Hungarian Court’s ruling follows the repeal of laws discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation in Lithuania (2000 - although the new
law has still to come into force), Estonia (2001), and Romania (2001).
Id.
Romania:
Until 14 November 1996 same-sex relationships in Romania were
illegal under Article 200 of the penal code. On that date Article 200
was amended so that the complete ban was lifted, but replaced with
provisions that were almost as oppressive and discriminatory.
Subsequent efforts by the Romanian government to ameliorate Article
200 were frustrated by the Romanian Parliament. On June 22nd 2001
the Romanian government issued an ordinance abrogating Article 200.
While this ordinance had the immediate effect of suspending the use
of Article 200 in the courts, it remained subject to the approval of the
Romanian Parliament and President. This has finally now taken place,
with the adoption of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 89/ 21
June 2001 by the Chamber of Deputies on December 18, 2001, and by
the Senate on December 20, 2001, and the approval of the President of
Romania on January 14, 2002. Article 200 included a number of
measures, including a discriminatory age of consent, a discriminatory
definition of what constitutes a public place, provisions relating to
same-sex acts causing “public scandal”, and provisions limiting the
rights of freedom association and expression of lesbians, gays and
bisexuals. The discriminatory age of consent law in Romania was
repealed on February 4, 2002.
Repeal of Laws Criminalizing Same-Sex Relationships in Romania Steps up Pressure for Repeal
of Discriminatory Laws in Cyprus, Hungary and Bulgaria, Feb. 4, 2002, at
http://www.ilga-europe.org/m7/media_releases/2002-02-04-RomaniaRepeal.html.
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nations offered several justifications for the different age of consent
277
First, nations were concerned with the need to
for homosexuals.
278
protect boys and young men. This concern arose out of sentiment
that a higher age of consent is justified, since many young men have
279
Second, some
not yet achieved a settled sexual orientation.
lawmakers felt that a function of criminal law is to protect young men
280
from contracting diseases as a result of homosexuality.
Advocates of lowering the age of consent, however, made several
counterarguments.
First, the current age (eighteen) did not
281
effectively stop young gay men from engaging in sexual activity.
Second, the European nations did not provide any evidence that
proved that the higher age of consent actually results in reducing
282
homosexual orientation. Third, because homosexual teenage sex is
criminalized, it “encourages a life of secrecy and deception for young
283
gay people . . . [which] makes them vulnerable to blackmail.”
Fourth, because sexual activity is illegal, the law discourages young
Cyprus: In July 12, 2002, after much pressure, Cyprus introduced an equal age of
consent for homosexuals and heterosexuals:
In order to remain on course for accession the Cyprus government
reluctantly compromised to raise the age of consent between
heterosexuals from 16 to 17 and to lower the age of consent between
homosexuals from 18 to 17. Eliminating the discriminatory age of
consent law is a major achievement. It is however “sad that the changes
are brought about in response of EU pressure rather that being
motivated because homosexuals’ rights are human rights” says ILGAEurope member, Alecos Modinos, Gay Liberation Movement of
Cyprus.
Cyprus Harmonises Age of Consent, July 12, 2002, at http://www.ilgaeurope.org/m7/media_releases/2002-07-12-CYConsent.htm.
While Europe pressures new nations to grant homosexuals full equality, “[t]hese
developments highlight yet again the shameful double standards operated by those
EU member states, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the UK, which still
maintain discriminatory laws.” Kurt Krickler, Romania Repeals Anti-Gay Law, Feb.
2002, at http://www.ilga-europe.org/docs/newsletters/2002-1/Romania.htm.
Lastly, Australia also recently saw such a victory. In New South Wales, the age of
homosexual sex was lowered to 16 (from the prior age of 21), on May 29, 2003.
Australian State Lowers Age of Consent for Homosexual Sex, May 29, 2003, at
http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2003/may/03052910.html.
277
Note the similarities between the old European “justifications” and the ones in
the Limon opinion. Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 235-38 (justifying higher age of
consent 1. to protect children; 2. because a minor may not yet have settled into a
sexual orientation; and 3. for the prevention of disease).
278
See Research Paper, supra note 268.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 10.
281
Id. at 14 (citing Why Introduce an Equal Age of Consent? Outright Scotland, 1994).
282
Id.
283
Id.
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gay men “from seeking advice about sexually transmitted diseases.”
Finally, because of the psychological impact of such laws, “[o]ne in
285
five young gay men has attempted suicide at some time.”
Tony
Blair, current Prime Minister of England, who at the time of the
debate held the position of Shadow Home Secretary, added:
[The issue] is not at what age we wish young people to have sex.
It is whether the criminal law should discriminate between
heterosexual and homosexual sex. It is therefore not an issue of
age, but of equality. By supporting equality, no one is advocating
or urging gay sex at 16 any more that those who would maintain
the age of consent for heterosexual sex advocate that girls or boys
of 16 should have sex. It is simply a question of whether there are
286
grounds for discrimination. At present, the law discriminates.

2. Indirect Regulation in the United States
In the United States, where homosexuality and sodomy only
recently began to receive federal constitutional protection through
Lawrence, there exists a possibility that backlash will result in states
enacting stricter laws to deter this conduct. Even though states can
no longer prevent adults from engaging in homosexual sodomy,
states may attempt to continue to prevent it among teenagers and
young adults, as Europe has done though higher age of consent laws.
One could argue that the Romeo and Juliet law discriminates in the
same fashion as the enactment of different ages of consent.
Although the Romeo and Juliet law does not specifically provide a
higher age of consent for homosexuals, it has a similar discriminatory
effect because it reduces the penalty only if the actors are
heterosexuals. Both methods serve as means of indirect regulation of
homosexual activities. Limon does not argue that statutory rape
should go unpunished, or that states should do away with the age of
287
consent; Limon simply advocates that there should not be different
standards and penalties if the actors are homosexuals rather than
heterosexuals.
Limon should prevail on this point for several reasons. First, if
284
285
286

Research Paper, supra note 268, at 14.
Id.
Id. Blair further stated:
[P]eople are entitled to think that homosexuality is wrong, but they are
not entitled to use criminal law to force that view upon others . . . .
That is, also, why the so-called compromise of 18 is misguided. What is
the rationale behind maintaining the stigma but a different age? . . .
[I]t is wrong to treat a man as inferior because his sexuality is different.

Id.
287

See supra Part II.
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courts allow a different penalty for homosexual conduct, they would
prevent some of the benefits homosexuals hoped to achieve from
their victory in Lawrence, since, once again, they would be subject to
288
discrimination.
Even more vital, through upholding the Romeo
and Juliet law, sodomy and homosexuality will still be illegal for a
substantial part of the population. Further, by providing a harsher
penalty for homosexuality, courts will be implying that homosexual
289
behavior is illegitimate and illicit.
This implication would be
290
contrary to the new progressive vision of Lawrence.
In essence,
Limon could serve as a pretextual means to counteract Lawrence.
Additionally, the purpose of the Romeo and Juliet law is to
punish certain relationships, however, not at the expense of teenage
291
experimentation. A refusal to extend the Romeo and Juliet law to
homosexuals deters homosexual teenagers from sexual exploration
more than it deters heterosexual teenagers. If the purpose of
consent laws is to punish abuse by older men seeking to take
advantage of younger, more vulnerable (mainly female) actors, this
purpose can still be accomplished even if states interpret the Romeo
and Juliet law to apply to all people equally, even homosexuals.
Further, while age of consent laws serve to protect the vulnerable,
Kansas does not put forth any evidence that homosexual teenagers
292
are any more vulnerable than heterosexual females.
Therefore,
Kansas is discriminating against homosexuals simply because it does
not approve of their conduct, which the post-Lawrence regime does
not allow.
Interestingly, unlike European nations that justified such laws as
293
protecting vulnerable young men,
Kansas justifies upholding
Limon’s punishment, and the Romeo and Juliet law, by maintaining
that if forced to undo the law, the change would promote other

288

As recognized in Lawrence, discrimination against homosexuals in law leads to
discrimination elsewhere. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in
the private spheres.”).
289
See supra text accompanying notes 281-285.
290
“The movement of this issue is all in one direction: toward greater acceptance,
and legal protection, for gays.” Fred Michmershuizen, Equal Rights for Gays, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at 28.
291
See supra text accompanying note 20.
292
One argument for having a higher age of consent for homosexual males is that
males mature later, about two years later than females, thus, there is some
justification that the average sixteen-year-old male is more confused than the average
sixteen-year-old female. Research Paper, supra note 268, at 38.
293
See supra text accompanying notes 278-280.
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crimes such as bestiality, child abuse, and pedophilia.
Some even
295
link pedophiles with the movement to lower the age of consent.
Further, to a lesser extent, Justice Scalia’s dissent points to similar
296
arguments where he fears the “homosexual agenda.” There is little
rationale, however, for these fears. Limon is not seeking to lower the
297
age of consent in general;
he is simply seeking the same
punishment as he would have received had he been a heterosexual.
294

See Judith A. Reisman, Crafting Bi/Homosexual Youth, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 283,
318-20 (2001/2002) (discussing a “homosexual political manifesto” and “homosexual
campaign to recruit children.” . . . The author cautions: “The homosexual movement
has long advocated ending age of consent laws” and that “as a result of such cult
proselytizing in schools and nationwide, many homosexual groups are now ‘chock-ablock full of young people.’ ‘Adult advisors’ also answer . . . the next phase, ‘to
attract young people to the gay movement in large number.’ Child ‘initiates’ (many
who die early of AIDS) are courted, given a pseudo-home and family, welcomed,
wooed, held and embraced.”). The author further cautions against this “homosexual
agenda,” quoting Harris Mirkin, an associate professor of political science at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City: “With more research, some scholars say, it may be
only a matter of time before modern society accepts adult-child sex, just as it had
learned to accept premarital sex and homosexual sex. Children are the last bastion
of the old sexual morality.” Id. at 326.
295
See Steve Baldwin, Child Molestation and the Homosexual Movement, 14 REGENT U.
L. REV. 267, 268 (2001/2002) (“Research confirms that homosexuals molest children
at a rate vastly higher than heterosexuals, and the mainstream homosexual culture
commonly promotes sex with children.”). Id. Further, “[h]omosexual leaders
repeatedly argue for the freedom to engage in consensual sex with children, and
blind surveys reveal a shockingly high number of homosexuals admit to sexual
conduct with minors.” Id. In addition, “the homosexual community is driving the
worldwide campaign to lower the legal age of consent.” Id. Lastly, the author
suggests, “[t]he Holy Grail of the pedophile movement is the lowering or elimination
of all age of consent laws.” Id. at 277. The author, a judge, also considers
homosexuality as “a sexual deviancy often accompanied by disorders that have dire
consequences for our culture.” Id. at 267.
296

Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a
law-profession culture, that has largely signed on the so-called
homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some
homosexual activist directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that
has traditionally attached to homosexuals conduct. I noted in an
earlier opinion the fact that the American Association of Law Schools
(to which any reputable law school must seek to belong) excludes from
membership any school that refuses to ban from its job-interview
facilities a law firm (no matter how small) that does not wish to hire as
a prospective partner a person who openly engages in homosexual
conduct.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). For more on
the “homosexual agenda” see Peter LaBarbera, 11 Ways You Can Fight the Homosexual
Agenda, A CWA RESOURCE, July 1, 2003, available at
http://www.cwfa.org/images/content/11ways.pdf (providing suggestions such as
“[e]ducate your family, co-workers, and friends about the homosexual agenda; Speak
out against ‘sexual orientation’ laws; Lobby corporation shareholder activism.”).
297
See Appeal Begins for Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36.
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Pedophiles will still be punished; the Romeo and Juliet law does not
protect them. Further, these arguments were put forth in Lawrence
298
and explicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, while age of consent laws and mitigating statutes such as
Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law are valid and reasonable ways to
regulate teenage sexual exploration and activities, Kansas has not put
forth compelling justification why such protections should not extend
to homosexual teenagers as well. Thus, applying this analysis,
Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law should be ruled unconstitutional.
Although minors do not have an absolute privacy right and thus may
299
not receive Lawrence’s complete Due Process protection, Lawrence
declared that homosexuality is no longer a crime. As a result,
homosexual relations, even teenage relations, should not be subject
300
to harsher penalties. It follows that Lawrence v. Texas and Kansas v.
301
Limon should be used to invalidate such discriminatory laws on the
basis that they are unconstitutional.
Therefore, even though Limon may have several differences
302
from Lawrence, Limon must derive similar benefits. Although it was
only the concurring opinion in Lawrence that advanced the Equal
Protection argument, the majority did not reject this argument. In
303
fact, the majority recognized it as “tenable.” Likewise, the fact that
the Supreme Court decided Lawrence upon Due Process grounds,
rather than Equal Protection, does not necessarily serve as a
304
limitation. Even prior to Lawrence, the Equal Protection Clause had
298

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
300
See supra Part IV.
301
Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 236.
302
See Greenhouse, supra note 14. “While Mr. Limon’s challenge to the Kansas
law was based on equal protection, and the majority opinion in the Texas case was
based not on that constitutional ground but on due process, it was evidently
sweeping enough to encompass equal protection cases as well.” Id. (citing Matthew
Coles, with the ACLU gay and lesbian rights project). “It’s an example of how much
is now going to open up,” Coles added, “[w]hen the court finds that gay relationships
are protected by the Constitution, it’s answering the equality questions as well.” Id.
303
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 574.
304
See Elmer, supra note 1.
In bringing Lawrence to the Supreme Court, the gay-rights forces found
themselves on the horns of an exquisite dilemma . . . . Should the gay
rights side argue substantive due process, a disfavored doctrine that
had been soundly rejected in Bowers? Or should they argue equal
protection despite the uphill battle in trying to get to any form of
heightened scrutiny? Many amicus curice [sic] briefs were filed with the
Supreme Court. Interestingly, the one filed by a wide range of lesbian
and gay legal advocacy groups, including, among many others, the
National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, Gaylaw, the Lesbian and
299
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been successfully used to protect homosexual rights.
As set forth
below, however, homosexual challenges to the Equal Protection
Clause also contain many uncertainties.
C. Romer: Equal Protection
Because the Court decided Lawrence on Due Process privacy
grounds, the decision gave the Kansas Court of Appeals an “escape
hatch” through which it could refuse to apply Lawrence to Limon, as
Limon involved an Equal Protection challenge. Although Limon is
distinguishable from Lawrence in this respect, Limon can serve not
only as an interpretation of Lawrence, but also as a clarification of the
306
ambiguities of another breakthrough case, Romer v. Evans.
Gay Law Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Law
Association of Los Angeles, chose to argue only on equal protection
grounds. In their amicus brief, the lesbian and gay lawyers associations
made a calculated tactical decision that the substantive due process
argument was too risky and, consequently, argued equal protection
only.
Id. (emphasis in original). Elmer further added:
[T]he Court had a narrow ground upon which it could have struck
down the Texas statute, equal protection. Justice O’Connor was
right—the law did discriminate based on gender. In deliberately
choosing not to rely on equal protection, but rather to ground its ruling
on substantive due process, the Court went against its own general rule
of avoiding difficult constitutional issues if there are simpler ways of
deciding a case. Moreover, the Court was explicit in explaining that
the reason it chose not to rely on equal protection is that then Georgiastyle anti-sodomy laws would not come within the ambit of the decision.
That is, the Court wanted to reach out and make a far broader ruling
than was, strictly speaking, necessary. Equally important, is the Court’s
decision to rely on substantive due process may breathe a bit of fresh
life into the languishing doctrine.
Id. at 9. See also Greenhouse, supra note 14. “While Mr. Limon’s challenge to the
Kansas law was based on equal protection, and the majority opinion in the Texas case
was based not on that constitutional ground but on due process, it was evidently
sweeping enough to encompass equal protection cases as well.” Id. Further, this is
“an example of how much is now going to open up . . . [w]hen the court finds that
gay relationships are protected by the Constitution, it’s answering the equality
questions as well.” Id.
305
See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (invalidating an amendment to Colorado’s constitution
which named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual
either by “orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,” and deprived them of
protection under state anti-discrimination laws). The Supreme Court concluded that
the provision was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” and
further that “it had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at
634, cited in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (“In Romer . . . we refused to sanction a law that
singled out homosexuals for ‘disfavored legal status.’ . . . The same is true here. The
Equal Protection Clause ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”
(citations omitted)).
306
517 U.S. 620.
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The level of scrutiny applicable to sexual orientation has long
been debated. In 1996, the United States Supreme Court came close
307
308
to addressing this issue. In Romer v. Evans, the Court, for the first
309
time, invalidated discrimination based on sexual orientation. Romer
involved a challenge to a proposed amendment to the Colorado
310
constitution. The amendment repealed all state and local laws that
prohibited discrimination against homosexuals, as well as prohibit
311
future protective laws. Romer asserted that even when a justification
is presented as a purported moral basis for a law, animus against gays
312
and lesbians is not a valid justification.
Further, while the United
States Supreme Court did not openly reach the question of whether
sexual orientation deserves heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, “it held that the proposed amendment failed to
pass constitutional muster even under rational review, a weaker
313
standard of judicial scrutiny.” Thus, although the standard lacked
clarity and the Court seemed to apply only a rational basis standard of
review, the decision indicated some judicial willingness to use the
Equal Protection Clause to protect homosexuals from
314
discrimination.
Several scholars have interpreted Romer as proposing “that the
Court is . . . applying a . . . heightened standard of review to sexual
orientation classifications, one either equivalent to the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review it applies to sex classifications, or a
standard in between mere rational review and intermediate
315
scrutiny.”
The Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly
declared which standard applies, contributing to uncertainty. If
316
Limon does make its way back to the Supreme Court, the Court can
finally declare which standard of scrutiny applies. Thus, Limon can
307

See Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 471, 483 (2001). Note that in Rowland v. Mad River Local
School District, in a dissent to a denial of a writ of certiorari, Justice William Brennan,
joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, argued that “discrimination against
homosexuals . . . raises significant constitutional questions under . . . equal
protection analysis.” 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). However,
because this is a dissent, it has no precedential value.
308
517 U.S. 620.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 623.
311
Id.
312
Id. at 644.
313
Stein, supra note 307, at 483.
314
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.7.4., at
759 (2d ed. 2002).
315
See Stein, supra note 307, at 483.
316
See supra text accompanying note 39.
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serve to settle this ongoing dispute.
The significance of both Lawrence and Limon cannot be
understated; scholars have seen a “historic parallel” in the early
317
judicial reaction to Lawrence to that of Brown v. Board of Education.
Fifty years ago, in the aftermath of the legendary case of Brown v.
318
Board of Education —which declared segregation of public schools
unconstitutional—some judges “interpreted Brown narrowly, ignored
it, or even defied it – until the Court forcefully ruled in Cooper v.
319
Aaron
in 1958 that its Brown mandate could no longer be
320
resisted.”
Likewise, today “[we are] in very much a 1956-type
historical setting, where the previous paradigm of inequality is
suddenly upended and a surprising new mandate of full equality is
321
ordered . . . .”
Limon may parallel the effect of Cooper by resolving
322
the ambiguities of Lawrence
and thereby prevent states from
indirectly regulating homosexuals, fill in the blanks of Romer v.
323
Evans, and release Mathew Limon from his seventeen-year jail term.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lawrence was thought to be a sweeping victory; it opened up
doors in the gay movement and granted a number of rights, all which
seemed unattainable under the previous Bowers regime. New hope
now exists for advocates of gay marriage, gay adoption, and various
other homosexual issues. While the Court in Lawrence clearly
extended a right to engage in homosexual activity to adults, Limon
poses an even more controversial issue—should this right extend to
minors?
Such an issue is crucial at this point in time: the Limon case is a
“test case” to determine how far Lawrence will be interpreted. A
positive outcome will not only grant teenagers the freedom to live a
homosexual lifestyle, but also send out a positive hope for the future,
allowing them to feel accepted rather than criminal. Furthermore,
Limon can serve as a preventative measure for a state backlash that
could minimize Lawrence’s triumph; Limon can prohibit states from
raising the age of consent for homosexual activity, as Europe has
done. A decision favoring Limon will send out the message that
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Mauro, supra note 189, at 1.
349 U.S. 294 (1954).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Mauro, supra note 189, at 1.
Id.
539 U.S. 558.
517 U.S. 620.
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Lawrence, is in fact, a “sweeping” victory for gay rights.
Further, even if Lawrence does not directly control Limon,
independent grounds exist for Limon’s immediate release. The
Romeo and Juliet law, as applied, is unconstitutional because it grants
heterosexuals more protection than homosexuals, even though they
have committed the same crime. Therefore, in Limon, the Kansas
Supreme Court, once again, has the opportunity to extend the
Lawrence decision to protect young adults, and in the revolutionary
aftermath of Lawrence, it may have to do so.
Finally, the Lawrence victory so far has been less than triumphant,
with many setbacks, including Limon. Whether courts should
interpret Lawrence broadly or narrowly has still not been decided, and
lower courts are currently divided on this issue. Eventually, one of
these cases interpreting Lawrence narrowly may make its way back to
the United States Supreme Court. Limon may be a good case for the
Court to decide because it poses an opportunity to clarify Lawrence’s
analysis, as well as articulate that a heightened standard of scrutiny
should apply in laws differentiating between heterosexuals and
homosexuals. Depending on the Supreme Court’s composition at
the time of consideration, however, the Court may expand Lawrence
or further limit it.

